Solomonoff unified Occam's razor and Epicurus' principle of multiple explanations to one elegant, formal, universal theory of inductive inference, which initiated the field of algorithmic information theory. His central result is that the posterior of his universal semimeasure M converges rapidly to the true sequence generating posterior µ, if the latter is computable. Hence, M is eligible as a universal predictor in case of unknown µ. We investigate the existence and convergence of computable universal (semi)measures for a hierarchy of computability classes: finitely computable, estimable, enumerable, and approximable. For instance, M is known to be enumerable, but not finitely computable, and to dominate all enumerable semimeasures. We define seven classes of (semi)measures based on these four computability concepts. Each class may or may not contain a (semi)measure which dominates all elements of another class. The analysis of these 49 cases can be reduced to four basic cases, two of them being new. The results hold for discrete and continuous semimeasures. We also investigate more closely the types of convergence, possibly implied by universality: in difference and in ratio, with probability 1, in mean sum, and for Martin-Löf random sequences. We introduce a generalized concept of randomness for individual sequences and use it to exhibit difficulties regarding these issues.
Introduction
All induction problems can be phrased as sequence prediction tasks. This is, for instance, obvious for time series prediction, but also includes classification tasks. Having observed data x t at times t < n, the task is to predict the t-th symbol x t from sequence x = x 1 ...x t−1 . The key concept to attack general induction problems is Occam's razor and to a less extend Epicurus' principle of multiple explanations. The former/latter may be interpreted as to keep the simplest/all theories consistent with the observations x 1 ...x t−1 and to use these theories to predict x t . Solomonoff [Sol64, Sol78] formalized and combined both principles in his universal prior M(x) which assigns high/low probability to simple/complex environments, hence implementing Occam and Epicurus. Solomonoff's [Sol78] central result is that if the probability µ(x t |x 1 ...x t−1 ) of observing x t at time t, given past observations x 1 ...x t−1 is a computable function, then the universal posterior M(x t |x 1 ...x t−1 ) converges rapidly for t → ∞ to the true posterior µ(x t |x 1 ...x t−1 ), hence M represents a universal predictor in case of unknown µ.
One representation of M is as a weighted sum of all enumerable "defective" probability measures, called semimeasures (see Definition 2). The (from this representation obvious) dominance M(x)≥const.×µ(x) for all computable µ is the central ingredient in the convergence proof. What is so special about the class of all enumerable semimeasures M semi enum ? The larger we choose M the less restrictive is the essential assumption that M should contain the true distribution µ. Why not restrict to the still rather general class of estimable or finitely computable (semi)measures? For every countable class M and ξ M (x) := ν∈M w ν ν(x) with w ν > 0, the important dominance ξ M (x)≥w ν ν(x) ∀ν ∈M is satisfied. The question is what properties does ξ M possess. The distinguishing property of M =ξ M semi enum is that it is itself an element of M semi enum . On the other hand, for prediction ξ M ∈ M is not by itself an important property. What matters is whether ξ M is computable (in one of the senses defined) to avoid getting into the (un)realm of non-constructive math.
The intention of this work is to investigate the existence, computability and convergence of universal (semi)measures for various computability classes: finitely computable ⊂ estimable ⊂ enumerable ⊂ approximable (see Definition 1). For instance, M(x) is enumerable, but not finitely computable. The research in this work was motivated by recent generalizations of Kolmogorov complexity and Solomonoff's prior by Schmidhuber [Sch02] to approximable (and others not here discussed) cases.
Contents. In Section 2 we review various computability concepts and discuss their relation. In Section 3 we define the prefix Kolmogorov complexity K, the concept of (semi)measures, Solomonoff's universal prior M, and explain its universality. Section 4 summarizes Solomonoff's major convergence result, discusses general mixture distributions and the important universality property -multiplicative dominance. In Section 5 we define seven classes of (semi)measures based on four computability concepts. Each class may or may not contain a (semi)measures which dominates all elements of another class. We reduce the analysis of these 49 cases to four basic cases. Domination (essentially by M) is known to be true for two cases. The two new cases do not allow for domination. In Section 6 we investigate more closely the type of convergence implied by universality. We summarize the result on posterior convergence in difference (ξ −µ → 0) and improve the previous result [LV97] on the convergence in ratio ξ/µ → 1 by showing rapid convergence without use of Martingales. In Section 7 we investigate whether convergence for all Martin-Löf random sequences could hold. We define a generalized concept of randomness for individual sequences and use it to show that proofs based on universality cannot decide this question. Section 8 concludes the paper. Proofs will be presented elsewhere.
Notation. We denote strings of length n over finite alphabet X by x = x 1 x 2 ...x n with x t ∈ X and further abbreviate x 1:n := x 1 x 2 ...x n−1 x n and x <n := x 1 ...x n−1 , ǫ for the empty string, l(x) for the length of string x, and ω = x 1:∞ for infinite sequences. We abbreviate lim n→∞ [f (n)−g(n)] = 0 by f (n) n→∞ −→ g(n) and say f converges to g, without implying that lim n→∞ g(n) itself exists. We write f (x)
Computability Concepts
We define several computability concepts weaker than can be captured by halting Turing machines.
Definition 1 (Computable functions) We consider functions
f is finitely computable or recursive iff there are Turing machines T 1/2 with output interpreted as natural numbers and f (x) =
, f is approximable iff φ(·,·) is finitely computable and lim t→∞ φ(x,t) = f (x).
f is lower semi-computable or enumerable iff additionally φ(x,t) ≤ φ(x,t+1).
f is estimable iff f is lower-and upper semi-computable.
If f is estimable we can finitely compute an ε-approximation of f by upper and lower semi-computing f and terminating when differing by less than ε. This means that there is a Turing machine which, given x and ε, finitely computesŷ such that |ŷ−f (x)|<ε. Moreover it gives an interval estimate f (x)∈[ŷ−ε,ŷ+ε]. An estimable integer-valued function is finitely computable (take any ε<1). Note that if f is only approximable or semi-computable we can still come arbitrarily close to f (x) but we cannot devise a terminating algorithm which produces an ε-approximation. In the case of lower/upper semi-computability we can at least finitely compute lower/upper bounds to f (x). In case of approximability, the weakest computability form, even this capability is lost. In analogy to lower/upper semi-computability one may think of notions like lower/upper estimability but they are easily shown to coincide with estimability. The following implications are valid:
In the following we use the term computable synonymous to finitely computable, but sometimes also generically for some of the computability forms of Definition 1. What we call estimable is often just called computable, but it makes sense to separate the concepts of finite computability and estimability in this work, since the former is conceptually easier and some previous results have only been proved for this case.
The Universal Prior M
The prefix Kolmogorov complexity K(x) is defined as the length of the shortest binary program p ∈ {0,1} * for which a universal prefix Turing machine U (with binary program tape and X ary output tape) outputs string x ∈ X * , and similarly K(x|y) in case of side information y [LV97]:
Solomonoff [Sol64, Sol78] (with a flaw fixed by Levin [ZL70] ) defined (earlier) the closely related quantity, the universal prior M(x). It is defined as the probability that the output of a universal Turing machine starts with x when provided with fair coin flips on the input tape. Formally, M can be defined as
where the sum is over all so called minimal programs p for which U outputs a string starting with x (indicated by the * ). Before we can discuss the stochastic properties of M we need the concept of (semi)measures for strings.
Definition 2 (Continuous (Semi)measures) µ(x) denotes the probability that a sequence starts with string x. We call µ ≥ 0 a (continuous) semimeasure if µ(ǫ) ≤ 1 and µ(x) ≥ µ(x0)+µ(x1), and a (probability) measure if equality holds.
We have M(x0)+M(x1)<M(x) because there are programs p, which output x, neither followed by 0 nor 1. They just stop after printing x or continue forever without any further output. Together with M(ǫ) = 1 this shows that M is a semimeasure, but not a probability measure. We can now state the fundamental property of
Theorem 3 (Universality of M) The universal prior M is an enumerable semimeasure which multiplicatively dominates all enumerable semimeasures in the
for all an enumerable semimeasures ρ. M is enumerable, but not estimable or finitely computable.
The Kolmogorov complexity of a function like ρ is defined as the length of the shortest self-delimiting code of a Turing machine computing this function in the sense of Definition 1. Up to a multiplicative constant, M assigns higher probability to all x than any other computable probability distribution.
It is possible to normalize M to a true probability measure M norm [Sol78, LV97] with dominance still being true, but at the expense of giving up enumerability (M norm is still approximable). M is more convenient when studying algorithmic questions, but a true probability measure like M norm is more convenient when studying stochastic questions.
Universal Sequence Prediction
In which sense does M incorporate Occam's razor and Epicurus' principle of multiple explanations? Since the shortest programs p dominate the sum in M, M(x) is roughly equal to 2
), i.e. M assigns high probability to simple strings. More useful is to think of x as being the observed history. We see from (1) that every program p consistent with history x is allowed to contribute to M (Epicurus). On the other hand shorter programs give significantly larger contribution (Occam). How does all this affect prediction? If M(x) describes our (subjective) prior belief in x, then M(y|x) := M(xy)/M(x) must be our posterior belief in y. From the symmetry of algorithmic information K(xy) ≈ K(y|x)+K(x), and M(x)≈2 −K(x) and M(xy)≈2 −K(xy) we get M(y|x)≈2 −K(y|x) . This tells us that M predicts y with high probability iff y has an easy explanation, given x (Occam & Epicurus).
The above qualitative discussion should not create the impression that M(x) and 2 −K(x) always lead to predictors of comparable quality. Indeed in the online/incremental setting, K(y)=O(1) invalidates the consideration above. The proof of (2) below, for instance, depends on M being a semimeasure and the chain rule being exactly true, neither of them is satisfied by 2 −K(x) . See [Hut03] for a more detailed analysis.
Sequence prediction algorithms try to predict the continuation x t ∈X of a given sequence x 1 ...x t−1 . We assume that the true sequence is drawn from a computable probability distribution µ, i.e. the true (objective) probability of x 1:t is µ(x 1:t ). The probability of x t given x <t hence is µ(x t |x <t ) = µ(x 1:t )/µ(x <t ). Solomonoff's [Sol78] central result is that M converges to µ. More precisely, for binary alphabet, he showed that
The infinite sum can only be finite if the difference M(0|x <t )−µ(0|x <t ) tends to zero for t→ ∞ with µ probability 1 (see Definition 9(i) and [Hut01] or Section 6 for general alphabet). This holds for any computable probability distribution µ. The reason for the astonishing property of a single (universal) function to converge to any computable probability distribution lies in the fact that the set of µ-random sequences differ for different µ. Past data x <t are exploited to get a (with t → ∞) improving estimate M(x t |x <t ) of µ(x t |x <t ).
The universality property (Theorem 3) is the central ingredient in the proof of (2). The proof involves the construction of a semimeasure ξ whose dominance is obvious. The hard part is to show its enumerability and equivalence to M. Let M be the (countable) set of all enumerable semimeasures and define
Then dominance
is obvious. Is ξ lower semi-computable? To answer this question one has to be more precise. Levin [ZL70] has shown that the set of all lower semi-computable semimeasures is enumerable (with repetitions). For this (ordered multi) set M = M semi enum := {ν 1 ,ν 2 ,ν 3 ,...} and K(ν i ) := K(i) one can easily see that ξ is lower semicomputable. Finally proving M(x) × = ξ(x) also establishes universality of M (see [Sol78, LV97] for details).
The advantage of ξ over M is that it immediately generalizes to arbitrary weighted sums of (semi)measures for arbitrary countable M.
Universal (Semi)Measures
What is so special about the set of all enumerable semimeasures M semi enum ? The larger we choose M the less restrictive is the assumption that M should contain the true distribution µ, which will be essential throughout the paper. Why do not restrict to the still rather general class of estimable or finitely computable (semi)measures? It is clear that for every countable set M, :
For the computability concepts introduced in Section 2 we have the following proper set inclusions
where M msr c stands for the set of all probability measures of appropriate computability type c ∈ {comp=finitely computable, est=estimable, enum=enumerable, appr=approximable}, and similarly for semimeasures M semi c
. From an enumeration of a measures ρ on can construct a co-enumeration by exploiting ρ(x 1:n ) = 1− y 1:n =x 1:n ρ(y 1:n ). This shows that every enumerable measure is also co-enumerable, hence estimable, which proves the identity ≡ above. If we ask for a universal (semi)measure which at least satisfies the weakest form of computability, namely being approximable, we see that the largest dominated set among the 7 sets defined above is the set of enumerable semimeasures. This is the reason why M semi enum plays a special role. On the other hand, M semi enum is not the largest set dominated by an approximable semimeasure, and indeed no such largest set exists. One may, hence, ask for "natural" larger sets M. One such set, namely the set of cumulatively enumerable semimeasures M CEM , has recently been discovered by Schmidhuber [Sch02] , for which even ξ CEM ∈ M CEM holds. Theorem 4 also holds for discrete (semi)measures P defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Discrete (Semi)measures) P (x) denotes the probability of x∈IN . 
Posterior Convergence
We have investigated in detail the computational properties of various mixture distributions ξ. A mixture ξ M multiplicatively dominates all distributions in M. We have mentioned that dominance implies posterior convergence. In this section we present in more detail what dominance implies and what not.
Convergence of ξ(x t |x <t ) to µ(x t |x <t ) with µ-probability 1 tells us that ξ(x t |x <t ) is close to µ(x t |x <t ) for sufficiently large t and "most" sequences x 1:∞ . It says nothing about the speed of convergence, nor whether convergence is true for any particular sequence (of measure 0). Convergence in mean sum defined below is intended to capture the rate of convergence, Martin-Löf randomness is used to capture convergence properties for individual sequences.
Martin-Löf randomness is a very important concept of randomness of individual sequences, which is closely related to Kolmogorov complexity and Solomonoff's universal prior. One can show that a µ.M.L. random sequence x 1:∞ passes all thinkable effective randomness tests, e.g. the law of large numbers, the law of the iterated logarithm, etc. In particular, the set of all µ.M.L. random sequences has µ-measure 1. The following generalization is natural when considering general Bayes-mixtures ξ as in this work:
Typically, ξ is a mixture over some M as defined in (3), in which case the reverse inequality ξ(x) × ≥µ(x) is also true (for all x). For finite M or if ξ ∈M, the definition of µ/ξ-randomness depends only on M, and not on the specific weights used in ξ. For M = M semi enum , µ/ξ-randomness is just µ.M.L. randomness. The larger M, the more patterns are recognized as non-random. Roughly speaking, those regularities characterized by some ν ∈M are recognized by µ/ξ-randomness, i.e. for M⊂M semi enum some µ/ξ-random strings may not be M.L. random. Other randomness concepts, e.g. those by Schnorr, Ko, van Lambalgen, Lutz, Kurtz, von Mises, Wald, and Church (see [Wan96, Lam87, Sch71] ), could possibly also be characterized in terms of µ/ξ-randomness for particular choices of M.
A classical (non-random) real-valued sequence a t is defined to converge to a * , short a t →a * if ∀ε∃t 0 ∀t≥t 0 :|a t −a * |<ε. We are interested in convergence properties of random sequences z t (ω) for t→ ∞ (e.g. z t (ω) = ξ(ω t |ω <t )−µ(ω t |ω <t )). We denote µ-expectations by E. The expected value of a function f : X t → IR, dependent on x 1:t , independent of x t+1:∞ , and possibly undefined on a set of µ-measure 0, is E[f ] = ′ x 1:t ∈X t µ(x 1:t )f (x 1:t ). The prime denotes that the sum is restricted to x 1:t with µ(x 1:t ) = 0. Similarly we use P[..] to denote the µ-probability of event [..] We define four convergence concepts for random sequences.
Definition 9 (Convergence of random sequences) Let z 1 (ω),z 2 (ω),... be a sequence of real-valued random variables. z t is said to converge for t → ∞ to random variable z * (ω) i) with probability 1 (w.p.1) :⇔ P[{ω :
In statistics, (i) is the "default" characterization of convergence of random sequences. Convergence i.m.s. (ii) is very strong: it provides a rate of convergence in the sense that the expected number of times t in which z t deviates more than ε from z * is finite and bounded by
Nothing can be said for which t these deviations occur. If, additionally, |z t −z * | were monotone decreasing, then Theorem 10 (Convergence of ξ to µ) Let there be sequences x 1 x 2 ... over a finite alphabet X drawn with probability µ(x 1:n ) ∈ M for the first n symbols, where µ is a measure. The universal posterior probability ξ(x t |x <t ) of the next symbol x t given x <t is related to the true posterior probability µ(x t |x <t ) in the following way:
where w µ is the weight (5) of µ in ξ. The latter strengthens the result ξ(x t |x <t )/µ(x t |x <t ) → 1 w.p.1 derived by Gács in [LV97, Th.5.2.2] in that it also provides the "speed" of convergence.
Note also the subtle difference between the two convergence results. For any sequence x 1 The implication "M(x 1:n )≤c·µ(x 1:n )∀n⇒lim n→∞ M(x 1:n )/µ(x 1:n ) exists" has been used, but not proven, and may indeed be wrong.
Vovk [Vov87] shows that for two finitely computable semi-measures µ and ρ and x 1:∞ being µ and ρ M.L. random that 
Conclusions
For a hierarchy of four computability definitions, we completed the classification of the existence of computable (semi)measures dominating all computable (semi)measures. Dominance is an important property of a prior, since it implies rapid convergence of the corresponding posterior with probability one. A strengthening would be convergence for all Martin-Löf (M.L.) random sequences. This seems natural, since M.L. randomness can be defined in terms of Solomonoff's prior M, so there is a close connection. Contrary to what was believed before, the question of posterior convergence M/µ → 1 for all M.L. random sequences is still open. We introduced a new flexible notion of µ/ξ-randomness which contains Martin-Löf randomness as a special case. Though this notion may have a wider range of application, the main purpose for its introduction was to show that standard proof
